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Abstract According to the Church-Turing Thesis (CTT), effective formal behaviours can be
simulated by Turing machines; this has naturally led to speculation that physical systems can
also be simulated computationally. But is this wider claim true, or do behaviours exist which
are strictly hypercomputational? Several idealised computational models are known which
suggest the possibility of hypercomputation, some Newtonian, some based on cosmology,
some on quantum theory. While these models’ physicality is debatable, they nonetheless
throw into question the validity of extending CTT to include all physical systems.
We consider the physicality of hypercomputational behaviour from first principles, by
showing that quantum theory can be reformulated in a way that explains why physical be-
haviours can be regarded as ‘computing something’ in the standard computational state-
machine sense. While this does not rule out the physicality of hypercomputation, it strongly
limits the forms it can take. Our model also has physical consequences; in particular, the
continuity of motion and arrow of time become theorems within the basic model.
Keywords Hypercomputation · quantum theory · theory of computation · philosophy of
science · arrow of time · discrete time · natural computation
Mathematics Subject Classification (2000) 68Q05 · 81P10 · 81P68
PACS 89.20.-a · 03.67.Lx
1 Introduction
According to the Church-Turing Thesis (CTT), all effective computational behaviours can
be simulated by Turing machines (Kleene 1952). Although CTT was proposed in the context
of formal mathematical systems, it is widely accepted that it can be applied more generally;
in particular, given that physical devices are routinely used for computational purposes, it
is now widely assumed that all (finitely-resourced, finitely-specified) physical machine be-
haviours can be simulated by Turing machines. However, this extended claim1 (known in the
philosophy and computer science literature as Thesis M (Gandy 1980; Copeland 2002), and
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2in physics literature as the physical Church-Turing Thesis; see e.g. (Deutsch 1985; Penrose
1990) and references therein) is not by any means a logical consequence of CTT, since it
is not clear that every physical machine can meaningfully be said to ‘compute something’
in the same sense as Turing machines. Proponents of digital physics (Wolfram 2002; Lloyd
2006; Tegmark 2008) stretch CTT still further, interpreting it to mean that all physical be-
haviours (whether machine-generated or not) are Turing-simulable.
The main aim of this paper is to investigate Thesis M and its extensions in more de-
tail. Is it actually true that all physical behaviours are necessarily computable, or are there
behaviours which go beyond the Turing limit? We will show that quantum theory can be
reformulated in a way that partially resolves this question, by explaining why physical be-
haviours can indeed always be regarded as ‘computing something’ in the strict state-machine
sense. While our approach does not rule out the possibility of hypercomputation completely,
it limits the form such hypercomputation must take.
As we recall in section 2, this question has been debated indirectly over many decades
(Stannett 2006); but it has become prominent recently with the rise of quantum computation
and digital physics. As is well known, Shor’s (1994) algorithm can factorise integers faster
than any Turing program, and this already suggests that quantum theory has super-Turing
potential. However, we need to distinguish carefully what we mean by ‘hypercomputation’
in this context. Where a computational model—for example, Deutsch’s (1985) Universal
Quantum Computer (UQC)—computes the same class of functions as the Turing machine,
albeit potentially faster, we call it a super-Turing model. If it is capable of computing func-
tions which no Turing machine can compute, we call it hypercomputational. In particular,
then, while the UQC is an apparently super-Turing model, it is well known that it is not
hypercomputational, whence its implementation would not resolve the question whether
hypercomputation is physically feasible.
1.1 Layout of the paper
We begin in section 2 by considering briefly what is already known concerning the relation-
ship between physics and (hyper)computation. After summarising the information-theoretic
approach familiar from It from Bit, we review three known hypercomputational systems:
non-collision singularities in the Newtonian n-body problem; the Swansea Scatter Machine
Experiment (also Newtonian); and Hogarth’s cosmologically inspired family of SAD com-
puters. We then focus on quantum theory, where it is unclear whether any hypercomput-
ational model has yet been established. The question then arises whether a new approach
might be able to resolve the issue. We will show that this is indeed the case, though only
to a limited extent, by deriving a first-principles reformulation of Feynman’s path-integral
model; we review the standard formulation briefly in section 3, and present our new formu-
lation in section 4.
In our version of Feynman’s model, there is no such thing as a continuous trajectory.
Instead, whenever a particle moves from one spacetime event to another, it does so by per-
forming a finite sequence of ‘hops’, where each hop takes the particle directly from one
location to another, with no intervening motion. Although this seems somewhat iconoclas-
tic, we argue that ‘finitary’ motion of this kind is the only form of motion actually supported
by observational evidence.
In section 5 we consider the computational significance of the model, insofar as it ad-
dresses the question whether hypercomputation is physically feasible. From a mathematical
3point of view it makes little difference whether we allow ‘hops’ to move a particle back-
wards as well as forwards in time, and we consider both models. In each case, the motion
of a particle from one location to another generates a finite state machine (technically, an
extended form of FSM called an X-machine (Eilenberg 1974)), where the machine’s states
are spacetime locations, and its transition labels reflect the (classical) action associated with
each hop. In unidirectional time, the regular language generated by such a machine com-
prises just a single word, but if we allow time to be bidirectional, the availability of loops
ensures that infinite regular languages can be generated. In both cases, when the motion is
interpreted as an X-machine, the function computed by the motion can be interpreted as an
amplitude, and if we sum the amplitudes of all machines with a given initial and final state,
we obtain the standard quantum mechanical amplitude for the particle to move from the
initial to the final location.
Section 6 concludes our argument, and includes suggestions for further research. We
note in particular that certain assumptions inherent in Feynman’s original model must be
regarded as provable theorems of the model presented here; this includes both the continuity
of observed motion and the arrow of subjective time.
2 Motivation
In this section we review various arguments both for and against the physical feasibility
of hypercomputation, and its converse, digital physics; for a more complete discussion of
hypercomputational models, readers are invited to consult our earlier surveys of the field
(Stannett 2003, 2006). The question, whether hypercomputational behaviours are physically
feasible, obviously depends on ones conception of physics itself. Hypercomputational sys-
tems have been identified with respect to both relativistic and Newtonian physics. Where
quantum theory is concerned, however, the situation is less clear cut.
2.1 Digital physics
Proponents of digital physics argue that the Universe as a whole is essentially computational,
in the sense that its entire history can be viewed as the output of a digital computation
(Schmidhuber 1997). The underlying idea appears first to have been proposed by Zuse, who
suggested as early as 1967 that the Universe might be computed by a deterministic cellular
automaton inhabited by ‘digital particles’ (Zuse 1967, 1969).
Wheeler’s subsequent (1990) It from Bit conception reflected his conviction that in-
formation is just as physical as mass and energy, and indeed the relationship between in-
formation and gravitation has remained central to theories of quantum gravity ever since
Bekenstein (1972, 1973) realised that black holes must possess intrinsic entropy. Likewise,
Hawking’s observation that black holes can evaporate (Hawking 1974) forces us to ask what
happens to quantum correlations that previously existed between particles on either side
of the event horizon? Quantum theory appears to be inconsistent with causality in such a
situation (Susskind and Lindesay 2005).2
The It from Bit doctrine focusses on the relationship between observation and informa-
tion. Just as observations provide information, so information can affect observations, as was
graphically illustrated (at first theoretically and eventually experimentally) by Wheeler’s fa-
mous ‘delayed-choice experiment’, a modified version of the dual-slit experiment. As is well
known, if one slit in a barrier is covered over, photons passing through the apparatus behave
4like particles, but when both slits are opened the ‘particles’ demonstrate interference effects.
Wheeler asked what would happen if the decision to cover or uncover a slit were made
after the photon had passed through the barrier, but before the outcome were detected. In
practice, the photon’s behaviour reflects the decision the experimenter will eventually make,
even though this decision occurs after the encounter with the barrier has taken place. This
suggests that the outcome of an experiment involves an interaction between the apparatus
and the observer; the results you get are in some sense changed by the questions you decide
to ask; or as Wheeler put it, “Every ‘it’ – every particle, every field of force, even the space-
time continuum itself – derives its function, its meaning, its very existence entirely – even
if in some contexts indirectly – from the apparatus-elicited answers to yes-or-no questions,
binary choices, bits” (Horgan 1991).
Schmidhuber (1997, 2000) has investigated a model of physics in which all possible
realities are the outcomes of computations. By considering algorithmic complexity, we can
examine the probability that a randomly selected universe would conform to any given set
of behaviours; specific physical situations can be examined and predictions made, some of
which might, in principle, be subject to experimental verification. It is important to note,
however, that the type of physics this model generates is not generally consistent with con-
ventional wisdom. For example, because digital physics assumes that universes are inher-
ently deterministic, Schmidhuber’s model rejects the notion that beta decay is truly random.
Similarly, his model suggests that experiments carried out on widely-separated, but initially
entangled, particles, should display non-local algorithmic regularities, a prediction which,
he notes, ‘runs against current mainstream trends in physics’.
A related concept is Tegmark’s Mathematical Universe Hypothesis. Tegmark (2008)
notes that, if a complete Theory of Everything (TOE) exists, then the Universe must nec-
essarily be a mathematical structure. In essence, this is because a complete TOE should
make sense to any observer, human or otherwise, whence it ought to be a formal theory
devoid of ‘human baggage’; consequently the TOE (and hence the Universe it specifies) is a
purely mathematical structure. While this argument can obviously be challenged—it is en-
tirely possible that pure mathematics is itself a form of human baggage and that the concept
‘mathematical structure’ has no meaning to creatures whose brains have evolved differently
to our own—Tegmark shows that it entails a surprisingly wide range of consequences, but
interestingly, these do not include computability. Rather, Tegmark introduces an additional
Computable Universe Hypothesis, according to which the relations describing the Univer-
sal structure can be implemented as halting computations. This is similar to Schmidhuber’s
model, except that it is the relationships between objects that are deemed computable, rather
than their evolution through time.
2.2 Examples of physical hypercomputation
A key feature of the digital physics models described above—as well as, e.g. Zizzi’s (2004)
loop quantum gravity model—is that the models take the assumption of an information-
or computation-based universe as their starting point, and then ask what consequences fol-
low. This is inevitable, since the authors are ultimately interested in identifying experiments
which might provide evidence in support of (or which falsify) their models. Clearly, how-
ever, if experiments are to distinguish between digital physics and ‘conventional wisdom’,
it must first be necessary that digital physics and the standard model are not equivalent. It
follows, therefore, that digital physics cannot tell us about the feasibility or otherwise of
hypercomputation in ‘standard’ quantum theory.
5Unfortunately, this is precisely the question we wish to answer. Rather than invent a new
model of physics that is computational by fiat, we wish to determine whether the standard
model is computational. Our approach, which we outline in some detail in sections 3 and 4,
is to reformulate (a small part of) the existing model in such a way that its computational
nature becomes intuitively obvious. Before doing so, however, we should explain why this
task is worth undertaking—as Zuse (1969) put it, “Is Nature digital, analog or hybrid? And
is there essentially any justification for asking such a question?”
2.2.1 Newtonian models (and a challenge to digital physics)
It is not often appreciated that standard Newtonian physics supports both super-Turing and
hypercomputational behaviours, but as Xia (1992) has shown, the Newtonian n-body prob-
lem exhibits ‘non-collision singularities’, solutions in which massive objects can be pro-
pelled to infinity in finite time. This is particularly problematic for those models of digital
physics which claim the Universe is generated by essentially local interactions, like those
connecting processes in a cellular automaton, because the laws of physics are typically con-
sidered to be time-reversible. Consequently, if a particle can be propelled to infinity in finite
time, it should also be possible for a particle to arrive from infinity in finite time. Clearly,
however, there is no earliest time at which such an emerging particle first arrives in the Uni-
verse (the set of times at which the emerging particle exists does not contain its greatest
lower bound). Consequently, if all objects in the Universe have finite extent and finite his-
tory, the particle’s ‘emergence at infinity’ must involve some non-local form of interaction
between infinitely many of these objects. On the other hand, Xia’s model depends implicitly
on an idealised version of Newtonian physics, in which gravitationally bound point-masses
can approach arbitrarily closely (some such idealisation is unavoidable, as the system needs
to supply unbounded kinetic energy to the escaping object as it accelerates away to infinity).
While this means that Xia’s result doesn’t actually undermine the case for digital physics in
‘real-world’ terms, it reminds us that the situation is considerably more complicated than it
might at first appear.
A recent series of investigations, reported in Beggs et al. (2008), concerns a collision-
based computational system called the Scatter Machine Experiment (SME), in which a pro-
jectile is fired from a cannon at an inelastic wedge in such a way that it bounces into a
detector either to one side (up) of the apparatus or the other (down); if the projectile hits the
vertex, various scenarios can be posited. The wedge is fixed in position with its vertex at
some height x whose binary expansion we wish to compute. The cannon can also be moved
up and down, but whereas x can take any real value, we only allow the cannon to be placed at
heights u which can be expressed in the form u = m/2n for suitable m and n. By repeatedly
firing and then re-aligning the cannon, we can attempt to compute the binary expansion of x,
one digit at a time. The class of sets which are decidable in polynomial time, when a certain
protocol is used to run the SME, is exactly P/poly (the complexity class of languages recog-
nized by a polynomial-time Turing machine with a polynomial-bounded advice function).
Since P/poly is known to contain recursively undecidable languages (Goldreich 2008), it
follows that the scatter machine experiment—despite its evident simplicity—is behaving in
a hypercomputational way.
2.2.2 Relativistic models
The SADn hierarchy is a family of computational models which exploit the properties of cer-
tain singularities in Malament-Hogarth spacetimes (Hogarth 1992; Etesi and Ne´meti 2002).
6These are singularities with computationally useful properties; in particular, if a test particle
falls into the singularity, it experiences infinite proper time during its journey; but an outside
observer sees the entire descent occurring in finite time. By exploiting such a singularity, we
can easily solve the Halting Problem. For suppose we want to know whether some program
P halts. We set it running on a computer, and then send that computer into the singularity.
From our vantage point, the entire process lasts just a finite length of time, say T seconds.
From the computer’s point of view the descent takes forever, so if P is going to halt, it will
have enough time to do so. We therefore program the computer’s operating system so that,
if P halts, a rocket is launched—this is possible for this kind of singularity—so as to arrive
at some previously determined place and time, somewhat more than T seconds (from our
point of view) after the computer is launched. We then travel to the rendezvous point. If a
rocket arrives at the scheduled time, we know that P must have halted. If no rocket arrives,
we know that the operating system never had cause to launch it, and we conclude that P ran
forever.
Hogarth refers to this hypercomputational system as an SAD1 computer; it uses a stan-
dard Turing machine to run the underlying program P, but gains hypercomputational power
from the geometrical properties of the spacetime in which that Turing machine finds itself.
If we now adapt the construction to use a sequence of SAD1 computers in an attempt to
decide some question, the resulting (SAD1 + singularity) system is called an SAD2 machine,
and so on. Finally, by dovetailing a sequence of machines, one from from each level of the
hierarchy, and sending the whole lot into an appropriate singularity, we obtain an AD ma-
chine. The SADn machines decide precisely those first order sentences which occupy the nth
level of the Arithmetic Hierarchy, while the AD machine can decide the whole of arithmetic
(Hogarth 2004).
The physicality of Malament-Hogarth spacetime is, however, debatable, since it clearly
violates the Cosmic Censorship Hypothesis (Penrose 1998); in addition, there are various
technical problems associated with the transmission of the successful-completion signal
from computer to observer (Earman and Norton 1993, 1996). However, the related approach
of Ne´meti et al. (Ne´meti and Andre´ka 2006; Ne´meti and Da´vid 2006) exploits instead the
properties of slow-Kerr (i.e. massive slowly-rotating uncharged) black holes, whence Cos-
mic Censorship is no longer an issue; they have, moreover, addressed the technical problems
concerning signal transmission (Andre´ka et al. 2008) (see also the related paper, elsewhere
this volume).
2.2.3 Quantum theoretical models
Quantum mechanics is, perhaps, mankind’s most impressive scientific achievement to date;
it enables us to predict various physical outcomes with remarkable accuracy across a wide
range of both everyday and exotic situations. In addition, as It from Bit demonstrates, there
are clear parallels between quantum theory and information theory; since computation is
largely seen as the study of information processing, it is not surprising that the field has
proven fertile ground for researchers in both digital physics and hypercomputation theory.
One possible hypercomputational model in quantum theory is Kieu’s adiabatic quan-
tum algorithm for deciding Hilbert’s Tenth problem, concerning the solution of Diophantine
equations. Since this problem is known to be recursively undecidable (Matiyasevich 1993),
Kieu’s algorithm—essentially a method for searching infinite sets in finite time—must be
hypercomputational. Although Kieu’s claims are controversial and his algorithm has been
disputed by various authors, he has sought to address these criticisms in a forthcoming paper
(Kieu 2008). For the time being, therefore, the jury is out.
73 The Standard Path-Integral Formulation
As we explained in section 2.2, we aim to reformulate the standard version of quantum
theory from first principles in such a way that its computational aspects become essentially
self-evident. We begin by recapitulating the (non-relativistic) path-integral formulation orig-
inally presented in (Feynman 1948, §§3–4); see also (Feynman 1965). Given initial and final
locations qI = (xI , tI) and qF = (xF , tF) (where tF > tI), the goal of the standard formulation
is to determine the amplitude φ(qF ,qI) that a particle P follows a trajectory qI → qF lying
entirely within some prescribed non-empty open space-time region R. As Feynman shows,
this amplitude can then be used to generate a Schro¨dinger wave-equation description of the
system, whence this formulation is equivalent to other standard (non-relativistic) models of
quantum theory. In Section 4, we will develop a generalised finitary formulation of the same
amplitude, and show that it is equivalent to the standard path-integral formulation presented
below.
For the sake of illustration, we shall assume that space is 1-dimensional, so that spatial
locations can be specified by a single coordinate x—the extension to higher dimensions is
straightforward. Furthermore, we shall assume in this paper that the region R is a simple
rectangle of the form R = X×T , where X and T = (tmin, tmax) are non-empty open intervals
in R; this does not limit our results, because open rectangles form a base for the standard
topology on R2, and all of our formulae are derived via integration.3
Suppose, then, that a particle P is located initially at qI = (xI , tI), and subsequently at
qF = (xF , tF ), and that its trajectory from qI to qF is some continuous path lying entirely
within the region R = X ×T . Choose some positive integer ν , and split the duration δ t =
tF − tI into ν +1 equal segments: for n = 0, . . . ,ν +1, we define tn = tI + nδ t/(ν+1), so that
t0 = tI and tν+1 = tF . We write x0, . . . ,xν+1 for the corresponding spatial locations, and
define qn = (xn, tn). While each of the values xn can vary from path to path, the values tn are
fixed. To distinguish this situation from the situation below (where tn is allowed to vary),
we shall typically write q† = (x, t†) for those locations qn whose associated tn-value is fixed.
We will also sometimes write [q† ] or [q†1, . . . ,q
†
ν ] for the arbitrary path qI = q†0 → q
†
1 →
·· · → q†ν → q†ν+1 = qF . Apart from the fixed values x0 ≡ xI and xν+1 ≡ xF , each of the xn
is constrained only by the requirement that xn ∈ X , whence the path [q† ] has ν degrees of
freedom.
In classical physics, the action associated with a path p is given by S =
∫
p L dt , where
the function L = L(x(t), x˙(t)), the Lagrangian, is a function of position x and velocity x˙,
only. However, to form this integral we need to specify the motion of the particle in each
subinterval (t†n , t
†
n+1), so we assume that P follows some path q†n → q
†
n+1 that is classically
permissible. Each segment q†n → q
†
n+1 of the path has associated classical action S(q
†
n+1,q
†
n),
and probability amplitude
〈
q†n+1
∣∣∣q†n〉 defined for all q and (subsequent) q′ by 〈q′ |q〉 =
exp{iS(q′,q)/h¯}. The action S is determined by the classical Principle of Least Action. This
says that the classical path is one which minimises this action, so that S(q′,q) = min
∫ t′
t Ldt .
The total action associated with the path is S[q†1, . . . ,q
†
ν ] = ∑n S(q†n+1,q†n) and the associated
amplitude is the product
〈
qF
∣∣∣q†ν〉〈q†ν ∣∣∣q†ν−1〉 . . .〈q†2 ∣∣∣q†1〉〈q†1 ∣∣∣qI〉. Summing over all such
paths now yields the composite amplitude
φν (qF ,qI) = 1Aν
∫ 〈
qF
∣∣q†ν〉dxν 〈q†ν ∣∣∣q†ν−1〉dxν−1 . . .〈q†2 ∣∣∣q†1〉dx1〈q†1 ∣∣∣qI〉 (1)
8where Aν is a normalisation factor. All that remains is to take the limit as ν → ∞, subject
to the assumption that the resulting path x = x(t) is continuous. This gives us the required
amplitude φ(xF ,xI) that the particle travels from qI to qF by a trajectory that lies entirely4
within R:
φ(qF ,qI) = lim
ν→∞
1
Aν
∫ 〈
qF
∣∣q†ν〉dxν 〈q†ν ∣∣∣q†ν−1〉dxν−1 . . .〈q†2 ∣∣∣q†1〉dx1〈q†1 ∣∣∣qI〉 .
4 A Finitary Formulation
In section 3 we showed how the amplitude φ(qF ,qI), that the particle P travels from qI to
qF along some path lying entirely within the non-empty open spacetime region R = X ×T ,
is given by φ = limν→∞ φν . If we now write
∆n = φn −φn−1 , (2)
it follows from the identity φν = (φν −φν−1)+ · · ·+(φ1−φ0)+φ0 that
lim
ν→∞
φν = lim
ν→∞
(
φ0 +
ν
∑
n=1
∆n
)
= φ0 +
∞
∑
n=1
∆n .
This replacing of a limit with a sum is a key feature of our model, since it allows us
to describe a system in terms of a set of mutually distinct finite sets of observations. We
can think of this sum in terms of correction factors. For, suppose you were asked to esti-
mate the amplitude φ(qF ,qI) that some object or particle P will be observed at qF , given
that it had already been observed at qI and was constrained to move within the region R.
With no other information to hand, your best bet would be to assume that P follows some
action-minimising classical path, and so the estimate you give is the associated amplitude
〈qF |qI〉. Some time later, you realise that one or more observations may have been made
on the particle while it was moving from qI to qF , and that this would have perturbed the
amplitude. To take account of these possibilities, you add a series of correction factors to
your original estimate; first you add ∆1 in case 1 observation had taken place, instead of the
0 observations you had originally assumed. Then you add ∆2 in case there were actually 2
observations, and so on. Each ∆n takes into account the extra information acquired by per-
forming n observations instead of n−1, and since the overall estimate needs to take all of
the corrections into account, we have φ = φ0 +∑∆n.
The simple truth, however, is that continuous motion cannot be observed, because mak-
ing an observation takes time. The best we can ever do is to make a series of distinct measure-
ments showing us where an object was at finitely many closely-spaced instants t1, t2, . . . , tν
during the relocation from qI to qF . The classical spirit within us then tells us to extrapo-
late these discrete points into a continuous curve (namely, that path which ‘best’ joins the
points). It is as if we draw the individual locations on celluloid, and then play a mental
film projector to give ourselves the comfortable impression of continuous movement. But
this mental film projector—represented in the standard formulation by the construction of
limφν —is no part of physical observation; it represents instead an assumption about the
way the world ‘ought to be’. All we can truthfully say is that the object was at such and
such a location xn when we observed it at time tn, and was subsequently at location xn+1 at
time tn+1. Regardless of underlying reality (about which we can say virtually nothing), the
observed universe is inherently discrete. We can ask ourselves how the motion appears if no
9observations are made; the composite answer, taking into account all potential observers, is
given by some amplitude ψ0. If we ask how it appears if precisely ν observations are made
during the relocation from qI to qF , we get another amplitude ψν . Since these possibilities
are all mutually exclusive, and account for every possible finitely observed relocation from
qI to qF , the overall amplitude that the relocation happens is the sum of these amplitudes,
namely some function ψ = ∑ψν .
Although they both involve infinite sums, these two descriptions are very different, be-
cause ψn tells us the amplitude for a path with a specific number of hops, while ∆n describes
what happens when we change the number of hops. Nonetheless, prompted by the formal
structural similarity of the equations φ = φ0+∑∞1 ∆n and ψ =∑∞0 ψn, we shall equate the two
sets of terms, and attempt to find solutions. By requiring ψ0 = φ0 and ψn = ∆n for positive n,
this will ensure that the description we generate—no matter how unnatural it might appear
at first sight—satisfies φ = ψ , whence it describes exactly the same version of physics as
the standard formulation.
The surprising feature in what follows is that the description we generate is not unnat-
ural. Quite the opposite. To see why, we need to remember that amplitudes are normally
given in the form φn = exp{i(S1 + · · ·+Sn))/h¯}. In very rough terms, we can think of the
various S values as being essentially equal, so that φn ≈ exp{inS/h¯}. When we compute ∆n,
we are asking how φn changes when n changes; in other words, we can think of ∆n in fairly
loose terms as a measure of dφn/dn. Again arguing loosely, we can calculate dφn/dn ≈ iSφn/h¯,
and now it becomes clear why equating the two sets of terms works, for in essence, ∆n is
approximately proportional to φn. Since ψn is structurally similar to φn, in the sense that
both measure the amplitude associated with a sequence of jumps, it is not surprising to find
a similar relationship holding between ∆n and ψn. Since the equations we form will even-
tually include integrals with normalisation factors, these factors will effectively absorb any
remaining constants of proportionality.
4.1 Paths, Actions and Amplitudes
The standard formulation assumes that each trajectory x(t) is a consistently future-pointing5
spacetime path; this is implicit in the continuity of the representation x≡ x(t), which assigns
one location to each t in the interval [tI , tF ]. Since our formulation rejects this assumption,
we need to provide a different definition for paths.
We shall assume the abstract existence of a clock, represented by the integer variable τ ,
used to indicate the order in which observations occur. Each time the clock ticks, i.e. for each
τ = 0,1,2, . . . , the particle is observed to exist at some space-time location qτ = (xτ , tτ). We
call each transition qτ → qτ+1 a hop. A finite sequence of consecutive hops q0 → ·· ·→ qν+1
constitutes a path. As before, we take q0 = (xI , tI) and qν+1 = (xF , tF ), and consider the
properties of an arbitrary path from qI to qF via ν intermediate points, all of which are
required to lie in the prescribed space-time region R = X ×T .
We again write [q1, . . . ,qν ] for the path qI → q1 → ·· · → qν → qF . However, whereas
the intervals tn+1− tn were formerly fixed to have identical duration δ t/(ν+1), there is no con-
straint on the temporal separation tτ+1 − tτ in the finitary formulation; the path q0 → ·· · →
qν+1 therefore has 2ν degrees of freedom, or twice the number in the standard formulation.
Notice that we now write qn rather than q†n, to show that the value tn is no longer fixed.
What is not clear at this stage is whether hops need necessarily always be future-
pointing. The standard formulation forces this on us through its assumption that some con-
tinuous motion t 7→ x(t) is being observed, but this assumption is no longer relevant. We
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shall therefore describe two finitary formulations, one in which hops are unidirectional in
time, and one in which space and time are treated symmetrically, in that hops can move both
forwards and backwards in time as well as space. Both models are related to computation
theory, but the second is by far the more interesting, both from a computational, and a phys-
ical, point of view. The mathematical distinction between the two models is minor. If time
is unidirectional into the future, then tτ+1 must lie in the range tτ < tτ+1 ≤ tmax. Otherwise,
it can take any value in T .
In the standard formulation, any unobserved motion from one observation to the next is
assumed to be classical, and its amplitude is determined by minimising the classical action
S. Since we no longer assume that any such motion exists, we shall simply assume that
each hop q → q′ has a hop amplitude, denoted 〈q′ |q〉h, and that this amplitude (when it
is non-zero) is associated with an abstract hop action, denoted sh(q′,q), by the formula
〈q′ |q〉h = eish(q
′,q)/h¯
. One of our tasks will be to identify the function sh.
The amplitude associated with the path [q1, . . .qν ] is defined, as usual, to be the product
〈qF |qν 〉h×·· ·×〈q1 |qI〉h. The amplitude computed by summing over all paths of this length
will be denoted ψn, so that the overall finitary amplitude that the particle moves from qI to
qF along a sequence of hops lying entirely within R is just ψ(qF ,qI) = ∑∞n=0 ψn.
4.2 The Finitary Equations
Consider again the formulae giving the amplitude that a particle P follows a path from qI to
qF that lies entirely within the region R, subject to the assumption that qF occurs later than
qI—the standard formulation isn’t defined when this isn’t the case. We can write these in
the form
φ = φ0 +
∞
∑
n=1
∆n (3)
ψ = ψ0 +
∞
∑
n=1
ψn (4)
whence it is clear that one particular solution can be obtained by solving the infinite family
of equations
ψ0 = φ0 (5)
ψn = φn −φn−1 (i.e. ψn = ∆n) for n > 0 (6)
to find the hop-action sh. Since the terms φn and An are those of the standard formulation,
we shall henceforth assume that S, φn, ∆n and An are all known functions in what follows.
4.3 Solving the Equations
As usual, we shall assume that qF occurs later than qI (so that φn = φn(qF ,qI) is defined
for each n). We shall be careful to distinguish locations q† = (x, t†) for which the time of
observation is fixed in the standard formulation, from those of the form q = (x, t) used in
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the finitary version, for which the value of t is variable. Note first that (1) can be rewritten
to give us a recursive definition of φν , viz.
φν(qF ,qI) = 1Aν
∫ 〈
qF
∣∣q†ν〉dxν 〈q†ν ∣∣∣q†ν−1〉dxν−1 . . .〈q†2 ∣∣∣q†1〉dx1〈q†1 ∣∣∣qI〉
=
Aν−1
Aν
∫ 〈
qF
∣∣q†ν〉dxν 1Aν−1
∫ 〈
q†ν
∣∣∣q†ν−1〉dxν−1 . . .〈q†2 ∣∣∣q†1〉dx1〈q†1 ∣∣∣qI〉
=
Aν−1
Aν
∫ 〈
qF
∣∣q†ν〉φν−1(q†ν ,qI) dxν
(7)
and an identical derivation gives ψν in the form
ψν (qF ,qI) =
Bν−1
Bν
∫
X
∫
T ′
〈qF |qν 〉h ψν−1(qν ,qI) dtν dxν (8)
where the Bn are normalisation factors, and the integration range T ′ depends on whether we
allow hops to jump backwards in time, or insist instead that they move only forwards (we
consider the two cases separately, below).
Using (7) to substitute for φν in the definition (2) of ∆n gives
∆ν(qF ,qI) = φν(qF ,qI)−φν−1(qF ,qI)
=
[
Aν−1
Aν
∫ 〈
qF
∣∣q†ν〉φν−1(q†ν ,qI) dxν]−φν−1(qF ,qI) .
The case ν = 0 is worth noting in detail. The amplitudes φ0(qF ,qI) and ψ0(qF ,qI) de-
scribe the situation in which P moves from qF to qI without being observed. In the standard
formulation, it is assumed in such circumstances that P follows some classical path for
which the action S is minimal, while in the finitary formulation we assume that the particle
hops directly from qI to qF . The amplitudes for these behaviours are 〈qF |qI〉 and 〈qF |qI〉h,
respectively. However, we need to remember that φ0 and ψ0 are defined in terms of their
contribution to the overall amplitudes φ and ψ ; it is important, therefore, to include the
relevant normalisation factors. We therefore define, in accordance with (1), (3), (4) and (8),
φ0(qF ,qI) = 1A0 〈qF |qI〉 and ψ0(qF ,qI) =
1
B0
〈qF |qI〉h ,
so that, whenever qF occurs later than qI ,
〈qF |qI〉h = σ 〈qF |qI〉 (9)
where
σ = B0/A0 .
Taking principal logarithms on both sides of (9) now gives
sh(qF ,qI) = S(qF ,qI)− ih¯ logσ
and if we assume that sh should be real-valued (the classical action S is always real-valued),
then logσ must be a real multiple of i, say σ = eiρ where ρ ∈ R, whence |σ |2 = 1. Con-
sequently, |〈qF |qI〉h|
2 = |〈qF |qI〉h|
2
, and the two formulations assign the same standard
and finitary probabilities to the relocation qI → qF , whenever this is unobserved and future-
directed. Moreover, since
sh(qF ,qI) = S(qF ,qI)+ρ h¯
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we see that our earlier intuition is essentially confirmed: the hop-action sh (the best estimate
of the path-amplitude, given that no observations will be made) is just the classical action
S, though possibly re-scaled by the addition of a constant action of size ρ h¯ (which we can
think of as a kind of ‘zero-point’ action). For the purposes of this paper, the values of ρ and
σ = eiρ are essentially arbitrary; we shall leave ρ (and hence σ ) an undetermined parameter
of the model, in terms of which
B0 = σA0 (10)
and
sh(qF ,qI) = S(qF ,qI)+ρ h¯ if qF occurs after qI . (11)
The physical significance of ρ is discussed briefly in Section 4.5, in relation to null-hops.
4.4 The Unidirectional Model
If we wish to allow only future-pointing hops—we shall call this the unidirectional model—
there is little left to do. We know from (5) and (6) that each function ψn is defined in terms
of the known functions φ0 and ∆n. It only remains to identify the hop amplitude sh and the
normalisation factors Bn. As explained above, our solutions will be given in terms of the
undetermined phase parameter σ .
Since the side-condition on (11) is satisfied, the hop amplitude is given in terms of
the classical action by the formula 〈q′ |q〉h = σ 〈q′ |q〉 = σ exp{iS(q′,q)/h¯}, whenever q′
follows q.
To find the normalisation factors, we note first that (10) gives us the value B0 = σA0
directly. Next, when ν > 0, we observe that, since tν must come after tν−1, the range T ′ in
(8) is the interval (tν−1, tF ). Consequently,
ψν (qF ,qI) =
Bν−1
Bν
∫
X
∫ tF
tν−1
〈qF |qν 〉h ψν−1(qν ,qI) dtν dxν
=
σBν−1
Bν
∫
X
∫ tF
tν−1
〈qF |qν 〉ψν−1(qν ,qI) dtν dxν .
(12)
When ν = 1, (12) can be rewritten
ψ1(qF ,qI) =
σB0
B1
∫
X
∫ tF
tI
〈qF |q1〉ψ0(q1,qI) dt1 dx1
=
σB0
B1
∫
X
∫ tF
tI
〈qF |q1〉
1
B0
〈q1 |qI〉h dt1 dx1
=
σ 2
B1
∫
X
∫ tF
tI
〈qF |q1〉 〈q1 |qI〉 dt1 dx1
and, since ψ1 = ∆1, this gives us
B1 =
(∫
X
∫ tF
tI
〈qF |q1〉 〈q1 |qI〉 dt1 dx1
∆1(qF ,qI)
)
σ 2 .
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Finally, for ν > 1, (12) becomes
∆ν (qF ,qI) = ψν(qF ,qI)
=
σBν−1
Bν
∫
X
∫ tF
tν−1
〈qF |qν 〉ψν−1(qν ,qI) dtν dxν
=
σBν−1
Bν
∫
X
∫ tF
tν−1
〈qF |qν 〉∆ν−1(qν ,qI) dtν dxν
and hence Bν can be defined recursively, as
Bν =
σBν−1
∆ν (qF ,qI)
∫
X
∫ tF
tν−1
〈qF |qν 〉∆ν−1(qν ,qI) dtν dxν .
4.5 The Bidirectional Model
Far more interesting is the case where hops are allowed to jump backwards as well as for-
wards in time. It is important to note that the derivation of Bν given above for the unidi-
rectional model no longer works, because it relies on using (9) to replace 〈qF |qν 〉h with
σ 〈qF |qν 〉, and on (6) to replace ψn+1(qν ,qI) with ∆n+1(qν ,qI). But our use of (9) assumes
that qF occurs after qν , and that of (6) that qν comes after qI , and neither assumption is
generally valid in the bidirectional model. Consequently, before we can make progress, we
need to decide how 〈q′ |q〉h should be defined when the hop q → q′ moves backwards in
time.
To address this problem, we recall the standard interpretation of anti-matter as ‘matter
moving backwards in time’. For example, the Feynman diagram in Figure 1 shows how the
annihilation of e.g. an electron and a positron (its antiparticle) to form two photons can be
interpreted instead as showing an electron that moves forward in time, interacts with the
photons, and then returns into the past.

Fig. 1 Anti-matter can be thought of as matter moving backwards in time. A particle
arrives at bottom left, and the corresponding antiparticle (shown as usual with the arrow
reversed) at bottom right; they annihilate to produce two gamma rays, emitted top left
and top right. Time advances up the page.
Accordingly, whenever we are presented with a backwards hop by the particle P, we re-
interpret it as a forwards hop by the appropriate anti-particle, P. Writing S for the classical
action associated with the antiparticle P, we therefore define
sh(qF ,qI) =
{
ρ h¯+S(qF ,qI) if qI is earlier than qF , and
ρ h¯+S(qI ,qF ) if qI is later than qF .
(13)
It is tempting to assume that S is just the negative of S, but this need not be the case. For
example, since photons are their own anti-particles, they would require S= S. Or consider an
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electron moving in both an electric and a gravitational field. If we replaced it with a positron,
the electric forces would reverse, but the gravitational forces would remain unchanged, and
the overall change in action would reflect both effects.
Spatial hops - the physical meaning of σ . What about purely spatial hops that move the
particle P sideways in space, without changing its temporal coordinate? There are two
cases to consider. If qF = qI , the particle has not actually moved, and the classical solu-
tion S(q,q) = 0 holds valid. Consequently, we can simply extend our existing solution by
defining sh(q,q) = ρ h¯, or 〈q |q〉h = σ . This, then, explains the physical significance of σ—it
is the amplitude associated with the null hop, i.e. that hop which leaves the particle in its
original location from one observation to the next.
If qF and qI differ in their x (but not their t) values, we shall simply take 〈qF |qI〉h = 0;
i.e. we ban all such hops (this definition is, of course, purely arbitrary, and other definitions
may be more appropriate in regard to other investigations6; but for our current purposes
the specific choice of purely spatial hop action makes little difference, because the paths in
question contribute nothing to the integrals we shall be constructing). This doesn’t mean,
of course, that a path cannot be found from qI to a simultaneous location qF —it can, via
any past or future location—but that more than one hop is required to complete the journey.
Indeed, the possibility of purely spatial relocations is highly significant, since one could
interpret them as explaining quantum uncertainty: one cannot say definitely where a particle
is at any given time t, precisely because it is able to relocate from one location to another,
with no overall change in t.
Solving the Equations. As before, we know from (5) and (6) that each function ψn is defined
in terms of the known functions φ0 and ∆n, and it remains to identify the hop amplitude sh
and the normalisation factors Bn. Once again, our solutions will be given in terms of the
undetermined phase parameter σ . As always, we assume that tI < tF , although we allow
individual hops to move backwards through time.
To define the hop amplitude, we appeal to (13), and the relationship 〈q′ |q〉h = eish(q
′,q)/h¯
.
Taken together with our discussion of spatial hops, these allow us to define sh fully:
〈qF |qI〉h =

σ 〈qI |qF 〉 if qF is earlier than qI ,
σ 〈qF |qI〉 if qF is later than qI
σ if qF = qI , and
0 otherwise.
where 〈qI |qF 〉 = exp{iS(qI ,qF )/h¯} is the ‘classical amplitude’ associated with the anti-
particle. This idea extends throughout the functions defined in this section; for example,
when q′ is earlier than q, we write ψn(q,q′) for the amplitude that the antiparticle follows
some path q′ → q lying entirely within R. We will see below that the amplitude functions
ψn(q′,q) and ψn(q′,q) are, as one would expect, related to one another in a mutually recur-
sive way.
Now we consider the normalisation constants Bn. We already know that B0 = σA0, so
we consider the case when n > 0. Because hops are allowed to move in both directions
through time, the integration range T ′ in (8) is the whole of T . Consequently, (8) becomes
ψν (qF ,qI) =
Bν−1
Bν
∫
X
∫
T
〈qF |qν 〉h ψν−1(qν ,qI) dtν dxν .
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The integral over T splits into three parts, depending on the value of tν relative to tI and tF .
We have
ψν (qF ,qI) =
Bν−1
Bν
∫
X
∫
T
〈qF |qν 〉h ψν−1(qν ,qI) dtν dxν
=
Bν−1
Bν
∫
X
[IL(xν )+ IM(xν)+ IR(xν)]dxν
(14)
where IL(xν ) is the integral over [tmin, tI ], IM(xν) over [tI , tF ] and IR(xν) over [tF , tmax].
When ν = 1, (14) becomes
ψ1(qF ,qI) =
B0
B1
∫
X
[IL(x1)+ IM(x1)+ IR(x1)]dx1
and the integrals IL, IM and IR are defined by
IL(x1) = σ
∫ tI
tmin
〈qF |q1〉h ψ0(q1,qI) dt1 =
σ 2
B0
∫ tI
tmin
〈qF |q1〉〈qI |q1〉 dt1
IM(x1) = σ
∫ tF
tI
〈qF |q1〉h ψ0(q1,qI) dt1 =
σ 2
B0
∫ tF
tI
〈qF |q1〉 〈q1 |qI〉 dt1
IR(x1) = σ
∫ tmax
tF
〈qF |q1〉h ψ0(q1,qI) dt1 =
σ 2
B0
∫ tmax
tF
〈q1 |qF 〉〈q1 |qI〉 dt1 .
Thus IL(x1)+ IM(x1)+ IR(x1) =
σ 2
B0
[∫ tI
tmin
〈qF |q1〉 〈qI |q1〉+
∫ tF
tI
〈qF |q1〉〈q1 |qI〉+
∫ tmax
tF
〈q1 |qF 〉〈q1 |qI〉
]
and ψ1(qF ,qI) equals
σ 2
B1
[∫ tI
tmin
〈qF |q1〉 〈qI |q1〉+
∫ tF
tI
〈qF |q1〉〈q1 |qI〉+
∫ tmax
tF
〈q1 |qF 〉〈q1 |qI〉
]
.
On the other hand, (2) tells us that ψ1 = ∆1, and so B1 equals
σ 2
∆1(qF ,qI)
×[∫ tI
tmin
〈qF |q1〉〈qI |q1〉+
∫ tF
tI
〈qF |q1〉〈q1 |qI〉+
∫ tmax
tF
〈q1 |qF 〉〈q1 |qI〉
]
.
Finally, when ν > 1, the integrals IL, IM and IR are given by
– IL(xν) = σ
∫ tI
tmin
〈qF |qν 〉∆ν−1(qI ,qν) dtν ;
– IM(xν) = σ
∫ tF
tI
〈qF |qν 〉∆ν−1(qν ,qI) dtν ;
– IR(xν) = σ
∫ tmax
tF
〈qν |qF 〉∆ν−1(qν ,qI) dtν ,
and (14) gives us Bν recursively,
Bν =
σBν−1
∆ν(qF ,qI)
∫
X
{∫ tI
tmin
〈qF |qν 〉∆ν−1(qI ,qν) dtν
+
∫ tF
tI
〈qF |qν 〉∆ν−1(qν ,qI) dtν
+
∫ tmax
tF
〈qν |qF 〉∆ν−1(qν ,qI) dtν
}
.
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5 Computational Interpretation of the Model
To illustrate the full computational significance of our reformulation (especially the bidirec-
tional version), we first need to digress slightly, and explain Eilenberg’s (1974) X-machine
model of computation. This is an extremely powerful computational model, which easily
captures (and extends) the power of the Turing machine. We will then show that a particle’s
trajectory can be regarded as an X-machine drawn in spacetime, and that (a minor variant
of) this machine computes its own amplitude (as a trajectory).
5.1 X-machines
An X-machine M = FΛ (where X is a data type) is a finite state machine F over some
alphabet A, together with a labelling function Λ : a 7→ aΛ : A → R(X), where R(X) is the
ring of relations of type X ↔ X .
Each word w = a1 . . .an in the language |F | recognised by the machine F can be trans-
formed by Λ into a relation wΛ on X , using the scheme
wΛ = a1
Λ ◦ · · · ◦an
Λ
and taking the union of these relations gives the relation
∣∣FΛ ∣∣ computed by the machine,∣∣∣FΛ ∣∣∣=⋃{wΛ ∣∣∣ w ∈ |F |} .
If we want to model a relation of type Y ↔ Z, for data types Y 6= Z, we equip the ma-
chine with encoding and decoding relations, E : Y → X and D : X → Z. Then the behaviour
computed by the extended machine is the relation E ◦
∣∣FΛ ∣∣◦D.
Although the language |F | is necessarily regular, the computational power of the X-
machine model is unlimited. For, given any set-theoretic relation ζ : Y → Z, we can compute
it using the trivial (2-state, 1-transition)-machine with X = Y ×Z, by picking any z† ∈ Z,
and using the encoder yE = (y,z†), the decoder (y,z)D = z, and labelling aΛ = ζ , where
(y,z†)ζ = (y,ζ (y)). For now, given any y ∈ Y , we have ∣∣FΛ ∣∣=⋃{aΛ }= ζ , and
y(E◦|F
Λ |◦D) = y(E◦ζ◦D) = (y,z†)(ζ◦D) =
⋃
(y,ζ (y))D = ζ (y) .
5.2 Computation by admissible machines
In our case, all of the path relations we consider will be constant multipliers of the form
kc : z 7→ zc, where c,z ∈ C. The resulting machine behaviour will therefore be a set of such
multipliers, and we can meaningfully form their sum (which is again a multiplier). For rea-
sons that will shortly become clear, however, we will restrict attention to those paths which
visit each state of the machine at least once. We therefore define the additive behaviour of
such a machine M = FΛ to be the function |M|+ on C given by
|M|+ (z) = ∑
{
wΛ (z)
∣∣∣ w ∈ |F | , w visits each state of F at least once }
If M is a machine of this form, we will declare the behaviour of M to be the function |M|+,
and speak of M as an additive X-machine. Any finitary path [q ] = qI → q1 → ·· · → qν →
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qF generates an additive X-machine Mq with state set {qI ,q1, . . . ,qν ,qF }, alphabet A =
{h0, . . . ,hν }, and transitions {qn
hn−→ qn+1 | n = 0, . . . ,ν}. Each transition in the machine is
a hop along the path, and is naturally associated with the function hnΛ = λ z.(z.〈qn+1 |qn〉h) :
C→ C that multiplies any input amplitude z by the hop amplitude 〈qn+1 |qn〉h. If Mq is an
additive X-machine generated by some path [q ] with initial state qI , final state qF , and inter-
mediate states in R, we shall say that M is admissible, and that [q ] generates M. We claim
that each path computes its own amplitude, when considered as the machine it generates.
Computation by the unidirectional model. For unidirectional machines, each hop hn in-
volves a jump forward in time, so the states {qn } must all be distinct, and the path [q ]
forms a future-pointing chain through spacetime. Consequently, the machine Mq recognises
precisely one string, and the additive and standard behaviours of the X-machine are identi-
cal. The function computed by this path maps each z ∈ C to
z[(h0
Λ )◦···◦(hν Λ )] = z×〈qn+1 |qn〉h 〈qn |qn−1〉h . . .〈q1 |q0〉h = z×ψ [q ] . (15)
As claimed, therefore, each (unidirectional) trajectory directly computes its own contribu-
tion to the amplitude of any path containing it.
Computation by the bidirectional model. Equation (15) holds also for unidirectional paths in
bidirectional machines, but the general physical interpretation is more complicated, because
of the possibility of loops. Essentially, we need to distinguish carefully between two related
questions, viz.
– what is the amplitude that the path [q ] is traversed?
– what is the amplitude that the path [q ] is observed to have been traversed?
To see why, let us suppose that the path [q ] contains only one loop, and that m is minimal
such that qm+1 = qn+1 for some n satisfying m < n; write the associated sequence of hops as
a concatenation of three segments, viz. h0 . . .hν = u.v.w, where u = h0 . . .hm, v = hm+1 . . .hn
and w = hn+1 . . .hν . Since v represents a spacetime loop from qm+1 back to qn+1 = qm+1,
there is no observable difference between any of the paths u.v j.w, for j ≥ 1. Consequently,
while the amplitude for the path [q ] is just ψ [q ], the amplitude that this path is observed is
instead the amplitude ψ∗[q ] = ∑∞j=1 ψ [u ]× (ψ [v ]) j ×ψ [w ].
More generally, given the machine F generated by any bidirectional trajectory [q ], and
any two strings α , β which are recognised by F, and which visit each state at least once,
there will be no observable difference between α and β . Consequently, if we define
F+ =
{
wΛ
∣∣∣ w ∈ |F | , w visits each state at least once }
then the amplitude ψ+ that [q ] is observed to have been the path traversed will satisfy, for
z ∈ C,
z.ψ+ = ∑
{
wΛ (z)
∣∣∣ w ∈ F+}= ∣∣∣FΛ ∣∣∣+ (z)
and once again, if we think of [q ] as an additive X-machine, it computes its own contribution
to the amplitude of any path containing it.
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6 Concluding Arguments
Recall that an additive X-machine M is admissible provided there is some finitary bidirec-
tional path [q ] that generates it. Say that two paths [q ]1 and [q ]2 are equivalent, provided
they generate precisely the same admissible machine M. Clearly, this is an equivalence re-
lation, and given any path [q ], there will some equivalence class q˜ containing it. Moreover,
the amplitude |M|+ is given by summing the amplitudes of the various paths in q˜. Conse-
quently, summing over all paths is the same as summing over all admissible machines, so
that (regarding ψ(qF ,qI) as a multiplier),
ψ(qF ,qI) = ∑{ |M|+ ∣∣ M is admissible } ,
and ψ(qF ,qI) can be regarded as integrating all of the admissible machine amplitudes. In
the bidirectional formulation, then, the nature of motion in quantum theory reveals itself to
be inherently computational. It is not that trajectories can be computed; rather, they are com-
putations. As a particle hops through spacetime, it simultaneously constructs and executes a
computational state machine, and the amplitude computed by this machine is precisely the
amplitude of the trajectory that constructed it.
In section 2.1, we noted how digital physics assumes the existence of a computation
that computes each universe’s history, which suggests that the ‘computer’ which executes
the computation is somehow external to the universes being constructed. In contrast, the
bidirectional model is telling us that each universe is a process, in which each trajectory
is a sub-process which computes its own amplitude. Moreover, all of these sub-processes
interact with one another non-locally, because hop amplitudes are based on the classical
action, and this in turn depends on the ever-changing spacetime distribution of the other
particles. In other words, as we have argued elsewhere, quantum theory is best thought of,
not in terms of computation, but in terms of interactive formal processes (Stannett 2007).
Clearly, this idea has echoes of It from Bit, and indeed the bidirectional model helps
explain Wheeler’s delayed-choice experiment. The apparent paradox relies on two assump-
tions concerning the experimental set-up. First, the photon must pass through the barrier in
order to be observed on the other side; and second, we can reliably identify a time by which
the photon has travelled beyond the barrier (we need to make our delayed choice after this
time). Both of our reformulations refute the first assumption (the discontinuous nature of
hop-based motion means that the Intermediate Value Theorem cannot be invoked to prove
that the trajectory necessarily passes through the barrier), while the bidirectional model also
refutes the second assumption, since there is no reliable sense in which the decision can be
said to have been made ‘after’ the trajectory intersects the barrier. Thus the delayed-choice
experiment contains no paradox, and there is nothing to explain.
We should also be clear as to what our reformulation does not say. Throughout this
discussion we have focussed on the computational nature of trajectories, but it should be
stressed that there is an important distinction to be be drawn between what a process does,
and how that process is structured. This is the same distinction as that highlighted in section
2.1 between Schmidhuber’s and Tegmark’s versions of the computational universe hypothe-
sis: whereas Schmidhuber considers process evolutions to be computable, Tegmark requires
instead that their descriptions be computable. In our case, while we know that each trajectory
computes its amplitude, we cannot say that the amplitude itself is necessarily ‘computable’
in the Turing sense, because we cannot as yet identify the extent to which the two forms
of computation are related. As a process, each trajectory is computational, but the values it
manipulates need not be.
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6.1 Open questions
(a) Clearly, we need to determine the relationship between trajectory computations and Tur-
ing computations. There must certainly be some such relationship, because the admissible
X-machine model underpinning trajectory computation is closely related to the Finite State
Machine, which in turn underpins the basic structure of the Turing machine. Are values (like
the processes that generate them) constrained to be computable in any standard sense?
(b) Although we have exchanged continuous motion for motion based on discrete hops, we
have not as yet done away with continuous spaces in their entirety, because many of the
expressions given in this paper make use of integration. As we argued above, continuity
is not directly observable, so we would prefer a purely discrete model. We should there-
fore investigate the extent to which the formulation presented here can be re-expressed in
purely formal terms, for example using the pi-calculus (a standard theoretical vehicle for
modelling mobile distributed process-based systems) (Milner 1999; Sangiorgi and Walker
2001). More straightforwardly, can we adapt the models presented here—for example, by
replacing integrals with sums—to generate a truly discrete models of physics?
(c) Suppose we impose the condition that whenever a particle hops inside some arbitrary re-
gion (which we can think of as the interior of an event horizon), it cannot hop back out again.
This will have a global influence upon trajectory amplitudes in the bidirectional model, be-
cause every journey would otherwise have had the option to include hops that pass through
the excluded region. In particular, the observed positions of geodesics (assuming these can
be modelled in terms of finite trajectories?) can be expected to change position, whence the
presence of the excluded region will generate a perceived ‘warping’ of spacetime geome-
try. Does this warping agree with the warping predicted by, e.g. general relativity? Can the
bidirectional model be extended to give a model of quantum gravity?
(d) Feynman’s original path-integral methods appear to make various assumptions which
we have rejected, including such mainstays of real-world observation as the arrow of time
and the continuity of motion. The status of these assumptions in Feynman’s formulation
needs, therefore, to be considered in more depth than has been possible here. It may be
that they are spurious elements of his construction which play no actual roˆle, and which are
therefore logically independent of his formulae. But if they do indeed play a relevant part in
his formulation, they must necessarily become provable theorems within both the unidirec-
tional and bidirectional models presented here, because our models agree with Feynman’s
by construction. That is, any property that is (a) expressible in terms of ‘what is seen by
observers’, and (b) ‘built-into’ Feynman’s assumptions, must necessarily reappear from our
own equations, since these give identical results when used to calculate amplitudes.
Notes
1 Andre´ka et al. (2008) argue that the physical variant of CTT was first considered as far back as the
1930s.
2 There is as yet no empirical evidence that Hawking radiation, the mechanism by which evaporation
takes place, exists in Nature. However, the final stages of a primordial micro black hole’s evaporation should
theoretically result in a burst of gamma-rays; one of the goals of the GLAST satellite, launched by NASA on
11th June 2008, is to search for such flashes.
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3 Integrating over a union of disjoint rectangles is the same as summing the component integrals: given
any integrable function f (x,t) defined on a disjoint union R = ⋃α Rα , we have ∫R f = ∑α ∫Rα f .
4 Strictly, only the internal points of the trajectory are required to lie in R. Either (or both) of the endpoints
qI and qF can lie outside R, provided they are on its boundary.
5 As explained in his 1965 Nobel Prize address, Feynman 1965 subsequently described anti-particles as
particles moving ‘backwards in time’. In effect, our own approach adopts this temporal bi-directionality, and
places it centre-stage.
6 For example, suppose we know (from wave-equation methods, say) that P has amplitude η(x) to be at
location x† = (x,t†), for each x∈ X . A more intuitive solution might then be to take
〈
x†
∣∣y†〉h = η(x†)/η(y†).
This gives
〈
x†
∣∣x†〉h = 1 in agreement with the ‘classical amplitude’, but also provides information about the
relative amplitudes of all other spatial locations at time t†.
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